

Critical Realist Investigation of Real-Time Decision-Making Process Under Uncertainty

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The construction of training programs for psychotherapists, requires the production of a practical knowledge database, through research with a coherent epistemology, methodology and method. In order to locate an epistemology which correlated with the researcher-practitioner's practical approach to knowledge, exploration of existing epistemologies was necessary. The Critical Realist (CR) position enabled composition of the practice approach in coherent academic text. A method for tacit practical knowledge extraction based on dialog between an experienced psychotherapist and his trainee, while she underwent practical training, was developed. Practical knowledge was transferred from teacher to trainee and was transformed while it was apperceived and utilised by the trainee in her practice. A duoethnography was used to contextualise the dialog. That method was elaborated into a collaborative, cyclic research method, which is based on the notion that theories are fallible hypotheses which should be either verified or refuted, in the face of a reality test. In this paper the method is explored and presented including discussion regarding the different roles of the collaborative team members.

Keywords: psychotherapy, dialogue, tacit practical knowledge, extraction of tacit knowledge, knowledge database, training programs, epistemology, Critical Realism (CR), collaboration, duoethnography, philosopher, practitioner, critique, quality control, fringe division, method, fallible hypothesis, reality test, modes of inference, induction, anomaly detection

INTRODUCTION

This paper is a description of the research process which sought to produce a practical knowledge database in the field of psychotherapy for children, adolescents and their parents, for the purpose of the construction of training programs for professional practitioners. This knowledge concerning the relationships between parents and children, would be potentially relevant and useful to practitioners from many cultures, and accessibility to them could be achieved through academic accreditation for the research

process and the knowledge produced by it. The Doctor of Professional practice research programme at Derby University, UK appeared to be the appropriate platform for this goal. In order to achieve academic accreditation, it was necessary to identify an adequate epistemology, methodology and method, for conducting research in the academic setting for the conceptualisation of practical knowledge, and for the presentation of practical knowledge in academic discourse. My dissertation comprises a chronological account of my doctoral journey and critical review of epistemologies, which accompanies an artefact, in the form of a website which transparently exhibits all the evidence, information, resources and the practical knowledge products of the investigation.

I have worked with children, adolescents and their families in various educational and therapeutic settings for the past thirty-three years (since 1987). Prior to the doctoral research process which began in 2007, I graduated from an MSc in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and began to practice as a psychotherapist mainly with this young population. During our MSc studies, my co-student Anat Ben Salmon requested to learn from the previous years of my practical experience. Anat became my trainee of practice and being impressed by her academic proficiency and benefiting from her significant contribution to our discussions, I suggested that we become professional practice partners. Together we established a therapeutic centre, employing and supervising other practitioners in therapeutic mentoring. Later when we embarked together on the doctoral program, in light of the encouragement of Anat, my original supervisor and other colleagues, I decided to focus on the investigation of my practical approach to psychotherapy, turning practice into praxis. The professional dialogue between Anat and I over the next thirteen years, enabled the extraction of my tacit knowledge. Practical knowledge was transferred from me, the teacher, to Anat, the trainee, and was transformed while it was apperceived and then utilised by her in her practice. Aligning with Starr (2010), who stated that research understandings should have genuine applicability and meet the pragmatic demands of the field of practice, in my view, professional understandings can be considered to be practical knowledge only when they are transferred to another practitioner and utilised by her in her practice in accordance with her individual approach. In our framework, the knowledge transfer process was substantiated through Anat's utilization of the practical knowledge cultivated in our dialog, in her practice.

The training setting which I constructed with Anat resembled the traditional apprenticeship framework described by Stalmeijer, (2009), in that Anat had little practical experience and requested to acquire practical skills from me, the teacher, who had experience in practice (Stalmeijer, 2009). However, it differed from the traditional framework in that I never related to Anat as a novice, a receiver of the knowledge, but as a peer practitioner whose contribution to the shared learning process was equally significant to mine. Furthermore, throughout the whole process, I presented her with vignettes from my cases and allowed her to explore my decision-making process, instead of me instructing and supervising Anat's early practical work. Since my experience could only be considered to be practical knowledge following the trainee's utilization of its features in her practice, in order to conceptualise a model of practical knowledge transfer, I required an apprentice as much as she required a teacher. The predefined goal of the dialogic process was for each of us to develop our personal approach to practice, and not for Anat to replicate my approach to practice. This personal approach to practice would be based upon each of our individual positions regarding knowledge acquisition i.e. personal epistemology which would enable meta-observation of all cases which we would encounter in our respective practices. From this dialogic training process, we co-constructed a knowledge database which later comprised the subject matter of the training courses which we began to teach during the research process at ROTeM (ReachingOut Therapeutic Method), our professional institute for Practical Professional Training.

Thus, Anat and I implemented these real-life practical achievements in the field, but for the doctoral process, some significant challenges needed to be overcome. The first was the identification of an appropriate epistemic position for the introduction of practical knowledge into the academy through conducting professional practice research and composing the knowledge in coherent academic discourse. This challenge was referred to by Schön (1995) who stated new forms of scholarship such as research of professional practice, call for a new institutional epistemology (Schön, 1995). For me the epistemic challenge was also related to my view that the epistemic stance of the practitioner-researcher must align

with the epistemic stance underlying his practical approach and the way he relates to knowledge acquisition in general, a condition which was extensively discussed by Lester (2004) in his “Conceptualising the practitioner doctorate” (Lester, 2004).

In my dissertation, I present the journey of my exploration of existing epistemologies, interwoven with an account of the consequential occurrences which influenced my epistemic and methodologic decision-making process, as a practitioner-researcher. The research began in a phase in which I considered the positivist paradigm, and continued with a phase in which I considered the relativist paradigm. In the final phase, I positioned myself within the Critical realist stratified ontology, proposed by Roy Bhaskar R. (1978) which in my view, was the most appropriate philosophical framework for my research (Bhaskar, 1978). My epistemic requirements were achieved through elaborations on the CR ontology, which enabled me to present my research and the knowledge it produced in academic discourse.

Since, in my view, my epistemic stance as a practitioner-researcher must align with the epistemic stance underlying my practical approach, first I considered the way I relate to knowledge acquisition in my practice. My practical approach relates both to a person's behavior which is a concrete, positivist, quantitative phenomenon, and to his interpretation of the occurrences, which is qualitative in nature. My interventions are targeted at the interface between the positivist and relativist epistemic domains of the human experience. These requirements impose a philosophical barrier in themselves when composing text in academic discourse. My practical approach also places an emphasis on causality, in that I claim that all behavior is derived from the individual's personal reasons, related to his interpretation of both current and previous events as well as his conscious and unconscious goals and fears. Moreover, during the knowledge extraction process, Anat frequently asked ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions regarding my choice of interventions. Such questions assume that causality exists as an a-priori condition. My answers explicated the causal relationship between the reason for the choice of intervention and its practical outcome.

Since causality had to be considered in my research as the main aspect for investigation, and my previous academic-professional studies were an MSc in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, the first epistemology which I explored was positivism. According to Eidlin (2015), following the model of Newtonian physics, Auguste Comte (1798–1857) an early proponent of positivism viewed science as confined to the study of experimental facts and the relationship between them (Comte, 1976 [1830] in Eidlin, 2015). If I adopted this paradigm for my research, from the conceptualisation of my practice approach, I would be required to compose rules by providing examples of a recurring choice of intervention in similar clinical circumstances. A manual of such rules which any practitioner would be able to learn and apply in practice, would enable him to approach any case that may arise. Nevertheless, as Hume (1748) pointed out, the positivist paradigm is limited due to the fact that the observation of a sequence of events does not demonstrate causal relationships of cause and effect (Hume, 1748). Popper (1963, 1959/2009) criticized the criteria used by logical positivism to validate statements, and argued that a scientific theory could not be proven, but only refuted. Therefore, the best the positivist approach can provide is the ability to negate the existing hypothesis by demonstrating an exception to the rule (Popper, 1963, 1959/2009). In our prolonged discussions in which we explored my decision-making process for my choice of intervention, Anat frequently pointed out an exceptional case in which I had behaved differently from the hypothesised rule. Eventually, we concluded that it would be impossible to compose any such positivist rules due to the infinite variety of clinical cases and possible interventions.

Furthermore, while exploring the rationale for my choice of intervention with Anat, we explored the conscious and unconscious aspects of my practical knowledge, my previous experiences and my interpretation of them which led to my choice. This aligns with Davidson (1963), who proposed that our explanation of our actions, by reference to reasons related to intentions, motives or how the action was coherent to some wider pattern of behaviour, is also a form of causal explanation (Davidson, 1963). The persistent process of inquiry which I conducted with Anat, comprised the method through which tacit knowledge was extracted and explicated into the conscious realm. This process could not be conceptualised within the positivist epistemology which only relates to measurable concrete phenomena (Eidlin, 2015).

In light of the necessity to relate to the conscious and unconscious aspects of my practical knowledge, my previous experiences and my interpretation of them, during the second phase of the research journey, I

considered the epistemic position of relativism. It was in this phase that a difficult epistemic problem developed between Anat and I in our professional discussions and especially when we tried to compose texts describing my practice approach. At that time, following her parallel studies in Couple and Family Psychoanalysis, Anat had become familiar with the language of interpretivism, which is located within the relativist, anti-realist paradigm. She pointed out that, if I affiliated myself to the relativist school, it would be incoherent to use terms such as 'reality', 'occurrence' and 'truth' which I referred to when describing aspects of my cases. Weiss (2015) stated that according to Dummett's (1991) anti-realism, the existence of an external reality is hypothetical and assumed (Dummett, 1991 in Weiss, 2015). Therefore, in the anti-realist worldview, there is no reference to reality nor to concrete occurrences, rather only to the individual's experiences. According to Putnam (1981), and his anti-realist stance, an individual who aspires to see reality is claiming to possess a god's eye view (Putnam, 1981). From the relativist-interpretivist position, I could only discuss the way in which I experienced things and my experience is always the product of my internal world. When discussing relativism, Baghrarian and Carter (2018) referred to Rorty (1991) who made the important claim that we cannot say anything about either truth or rationality except through the procedures of justification which are customarily used for different areas of inquiry in our society (Rorty 1991 in Baghrarian and Carter, 2018). Therefore, in this epistemic position the truth is merely the individual's personal opinion originating from his unique viewpoint, each person's truth must by definition be different from the others. When two individuals concur regarding a certain description, one of them is adopting the viewpoint of the other for a variety of possible reasons. Therefore, the best I could accomplish within the relativist paradigm while researching and presenting my research alone, was to present my viewpoint on psychotherapy practice, grounding my statements on my practice experience, and hope that my supervisors and examiners would accept them. At this stage Anat played both the role of the researcher of my philosophy and its critic (or what I term the fringe division). In the latter role she identified the incoherence of these terms ('reality', 'occurrence' and 'truth') taken from the positivist school to my declared epistemic position at that time (relativism), and was unable to discuss or write down the ideas which I presented to her. Anat understood that the professional academic community who would assess my work required me to declare myself to be situated in either a positivist or relativist epistemic position and all my statements should be coherent with this choice. However, I struggled to reconcile myself to the interpretivist position within the relativist paradigm, when reference to concrete occurrences were part of my practice approach. According to Gorton (2010), the main aim of social inquiry for interpretivists, is to enhance our understanding of the social world meaning, rather than to provide explanations of causality for social phenomena (Gorton, 2010). I therefore became aware that causality cannot be inquired by positioning myself in the relativist school which claims to relate only to our experience of phenomena and their meaning for us. In short, neither the positivist nor the relativist domains could satisfactorily consider causality.

As I mentioned earlier, this ontological dilemma becomes more acute when composing text in academic discourse. In everyday conversations, psychotherapy sessions and the training of psychotherapy practice in integrative schools, it is possible to relate to both the realist and anti-realist positions in the same sentence. E.g. In a therapy session it is acceptable to inquire from the patient how he feels about or interpreted a concrete event which occurred. However, in academic texts the author declares his ontological position and his epistemic stance, and all statements in the text should be aligned with this position. Lester (2004) mentioned Seddon (2001) who pointed out the difficulty and differentiated 'second-generation' professional doctorates, which produce practical knowledge from the PhD in which a specific epistemological position is defined, and the process produces academically valid knowledge which is necessarily abstract and to some extent universal (Seddon, 2001 in Lester, 2004). In my view, practical knowledge can relate to both epistemic domains and by definition is neither abstract nor universal. However, composing text describing practical knowledge which relates to both domains in academic discourse will be incoherent, because the ontological claims of anti-realism are based on the rejection of the basic claims of realism and *visa-versa*. The Relativist-interpretivist position rejects our ability to know anything about the external reality whose existence in accordance with this anti-realist stance is considered to be hypothetical (Dummett, 1991 in Weiss, 2015), while empiricism-positivism is a realist position which claims that knowledge can only relate to aspects of the independent external reality which can be measured (Locke 1632-1704 in Connolly, 2014).

Therefore, it was necessary for me to identify an epistemic position that reconciles the philosophic value-fact dichotomy between the positivist and the relativist domains of human experience and relates to causality. This would enable me to define the process which I conducted as research of practice, and introduce the practical knowledge which it produced into the academy by presenting it in coherent academic discourse.

From 2017 onwards, the entrance of another researcher from a different field of practice, a physician, into our research team enabled me to overcome this epistemic challenge. Through dialog with Anna about medical practice, we identified epistemic similarities between my practical approach to psychotherapy and medical practice, and these aligned with the stratified reality of the Critical realist position (Bhaskar, 1978). My methodology as a practitioner and researcher seeks to approach an accurate understanding of the patient, his circumstances or the phenomenon under investigation in the actual dimension, by gathering data which is detectable in the empirical dimension. In medical practice, while the patient's illness is located in the actual dimension, what we know about his illness i.e. his signs, symptoms and test results are expressions of the patient's illness which we are able to detect in the empirical dimension. By gathering data regarding the patient's signs and symptoms, and medical testing, through a process of elimination, the doctor is able to approach the most likely diagnosis. Elaboration on the ontological premises of CR, enabled me to conceptualise a theory of personal epistemology, which related to both the positivistic domain (the actual dimension of CR) and the relativist (empirical domain) and also enabled reference to causality. While other frameworks such as relativism (Baghrarian and Carter, 2018), also propose that many different epistemic systems exist, my suggested framework made it possible for me to provide an explanation for how different people could view the same phenomenon occurring in the actual dimension and perceive it differently in their empirical dimension. This depends upon their physical location and previous experience which influences how they interpret what they perceive. The accuracy of each person's description of the actual phenomenon, can be assessed through forecasting of future occurrences at doxastic reference points and further observation of their realisation or non-realisation i.e. a reality test, and not through discourse.

The second challenge of the doctoral process was my methodology. In parallel to these epistemic stages, I conducted the first phase of my research alone, the second in collaboration with Anat and the third in collaboration with both Anat and Anna. Usher (2002) stated that D.Prof research is frequently collaborative either because the researcher is a member of a workplace employing a number of workers, or because the research is conducted with the full participation of other members (Usher, 2002). Furthermore, Costley and Lester (2010) stated that a representative from the candidate's organisation, profession or work context is also customarily involved in the process. Despite the fact that the EdD was presented to me as a D.Prof process, I was instructed by Derby University staff that the doctoral process is an individual endeavor. Therefore despite my on-going practice, and dialogical training process with Anat, during the first phase of my research process, I addressed these epistemic and methodological considerations in order to achieve my research goals by conducting the research process alone. By the end of this phase, I had conducted an extensive review of existing epistemologies and had investigated the specific philosophical issues underlying methodologies for the conceptualisation of practical knowledge in the academic environment. This led me to compose my Knowledge Evolution essay which ended with my suggestion for a methodology for conducting research in a collaborative team. The team would include researchers who originated from the academic-philosophic school (PhD) and professional practitioners (D.Prof), who alternatively fulfilled different roles, one of which was that of critic and quality control supervision which I refer to as the 'fringe division'.

During the second 'relativist' phase, despite the epistemic conundrum between Anat and I, we became convinced that the professional dialog between us was the foundation of our research methodology. We explored my previous experiences and my interpretation of them, the conscious and unconscious aspects of my practical knowledge, which underlay the rationale for my choice of intervention. This is aligned with the notion of tacit practical knowledge of the practitioner, which is mostly located in the subconscious realm, introduced by Polanyi (Polanyi 2009). My dialogic process with Anat was analogous to the psychotherapy process, in which dialog between two participants is essential for achieving access to this subconscious content. For this reason and also due to the necessity to transfer the newly conceptualised

practical knowledge to another practitioner and for her to utilise it in her practice, I understood that collaboration with at least one other researcher-practitioner was essential for research of practice. My dialog with Anat had already produced practical knowledge which comprised the foundation of the training courses which we began to teach at this time. However, only in 2017, following a long and bitter struggle between Anat, I and the University staff, our collaboration on our research was approved and acknowledged by the University staff. After that, Anat and I contextualised our professional dialog in the duoethnography method, resolving the issue of our choice of methodology.

However, during this period Anat and I discussed the discrepancy between us regarding our ontological and epistemic positions with our new supervisors. In light of this, our supervisors expressed their interest as to how we could conceptualise the transfer of knowledge from me, the teacher, to Anat the student, based on the duoethnography, when each was positioned within a different epistemic stance. Anat had acquired understandings from our discussions, which provided her with practical skills which she adopted in her practice. However, Anat's understanding of the value fact dichotomy made it impossible for her to accept my definition of situations and my conceptualisation of my cases, which related to what I described as concrete events which had occurred.

In the final stage of the research process, I overcame this obstacle by elaborating on the CR ontology described by Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1978). The CR framework enabled an explanation as to how knowledge was transferred from the teacher (myself) to the student (Anat), in a manner that was significantly different from the traditional teacher-student apprenticeship setting. In the relativistic worldview, knowledge is produced through agreement following discourse. Rorty (1993) claimed that the only form of validation available to us is obtained through agreement with our peers, and that warrant is "a sociological matter, achieved through discourse with others" (Rorty, 1993). In accordance with this, agreement is reached when one of the participants relinquishes his position, and adopts that of the other due to his better/stronger justification or persuasion skills. In the traditional teaching setting, the teacher is considered more knowledgeable and experienced and the student is expected to adopt his knowledge as-is and make it his own. This aligns with Halabi (2017) who referred to Freire, who claimed that traditional schooling is founded on a "banking" concept in which the teacher "deposits" knowledge into the students' "accounts", in order to "withdraw" that knowledge at a later stage (Freire, 1970 in Halabi, 2017). In our training setting, we discussed an actual occurrence, a clinical circumstance presented by me in a vignette. From our discussion about how I managed the situation, the student developed her own practical understandings and an approach to her cases which was different from mine. This developed following her apperception of the knowledge, locating analogies to her world, in light of her individual position in the empirical dimension from which she viewed the actual occurrence. Thus, we utilized the dialogical method described by Freire and Shor (1987), which is a collaborative learning process where the teacher introduces critical problems for examination. Dialogue is far more than a technique to achieve cognitive results in the students. In this method, the learning process is transformed into a collaborative study, which examines a phenomenon and acts to change reality (Freire and Shor, 1987). Thus the notion of Anat and I viewing the same concrete occurrence in the actual dimension, from their different perception in the empirical dimension, enabled an explanation as to how Anat acquired practical knowledge from me while developing her individual practical approach, following discussions with me about my approach.

Another challenge of the research process was my ADHD and dysgraphia, which made composing organised text in any language very difficult for me. In order to compose my dissertation, it was necessary for me to expound my thoughts to a qualified assistant who would assist me in organising, translating and transcribing them in coherent text. However, involving my co-researchers in my writing process, due to my personal difficulty, reinforced my understanding of the necessity for collaboration in this stage of the research and developed into the mainstay for my suggested methodology for research of professional practice. Even if the practitioner-researcher possesses exceptional writing skills, there are a number of crucial reasons why I recommend that he conducts his 'research of practice' and writing-up process with at least two other practitioner researchers with a professional interest in his practical knowledge. If he conducts both the research and writing-up process alone, his dissertation will be comprised entirely of his conscious defensive justifications for his practice approach, and his valuable tacit knowledge would remain

concealed. Feedback from his colleagues resulting from their reflection and criticism occurs only after the dissertation is completed and disseminated. In his article on the diversity of doctorates, Usher (2002) stated that the traditional PhD by thesis directs research into narrow disciplinary domains and encourages a lone, “ivory tower” way of working which is inappropriate for utilizable, practical knowledge which is collaboratively produced (Usher, 2002). When conducting the writing process with another practitioner, the researcher-practitioner’s statements are presented for the reflection and critique of the other during the process, making him aware of the subconscious aspects of his tacit knowledge, and enabling him to explicate them in written academic discourse. Aligned with Usher (2002) who referred to collaboration of co-researchers at many stages and aspects of practical project-based-doctorates, from my experience, the collaboration of researchers in research and the writing-up process is essential especially in research of professional practice.

My practical, epistemic elaboration of the premises of CR, enabled the conceptualization of the suggested methodology and method for the production of practical knowledge in the academy, which was also based on the collaboration of researchers. The methodology considers theory to be a fallible hypothesis which needs to be either verified or refuted, in the face of a reality test. Thus I suggest a cyclic process of gathering data, composing a forecast, constructing a hypothesis, probing for a certain result through active intervention, observing the outcome and detecting anomalies, as a methodology for practice and research. Modes of inference of induction, deduction, abduction and retroduction comprise the structure of the method and facilitate the progress between the different stages in the cycle. The conceptualization of my methodology and method was an elaboration on the suggestions which I presented in my Knowledge Evolution essay in 2012. This was possible following our utilisation of this methodology for the extraction of tacit practical knowledge while each of us adopted a different essential role in our ‘trialogue’ research and text construction procedure. Furthermore, we produced meaningful intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary practical knowledge through dialog related to each participant’s view on a specific circumstance arising in professional practice. This aligned with Costley & Armsby (2007) who stated that in the most developed examples of practice-based research it is a transdisciplinary field rather than a mode of learning within a one specific discipline (Costley & Armsby, 2007).

Another characteristic which distinguishes practice-based doctorates from the PhD is the nature of the product of the research process. Usher (2002) stated that the outcome of these doctorates is a significant “artefact” produced through the project which has substantial applicability and benefit to the field of practice accompanied by a short written critical text, and not a written dissertation. I have produced such an artefact, the content of which is being extensively applied in my practice, that of my co-researchers and in our training school. As well as my practical artefact, I have also constructed an organised, 120,000-word, dissertation in the form of a critical review, describing the authentic research process of thirteen years. I did the latter through my suggested collaborative methodology, which I advocate as an improved generic procedure for conducting research of practice and writing the dissertation, which can be adopted by any team of practitioners. However, the staff of my University persistently mis-directed me away from presenting my outcomes as a creative work, and encouraged a traditional nine-chapter written dissertation, failing to acknowledge the fundamental methodological differences between practice-based doctorates and the traditional PhD. Since responsibility for the choice of methodology lies with the researcher, I conducted my research in absolute alignment with the requirements of practice-based doctorates described by Costley and Lester (2010), Lester (2004) and Usher (2002). I have achieved practical outcomes applicable in mine and related fields of professional practice, and academic accomplishments, which include solid justification for the critical necessity for the collaboration of researchers in such processes. Although I achieved the construction of a written dissertation, this could not be done in the nine-chapter format due to the nature of my outcomes. My suggested epistemology, methodology and method which I utilised for the process, could not comprise both the methodology and outcome chapter. The staff overseeing my supervision did not encourage my presentation of a creative work outcome of my research, feeling that they would be unable to assess its standard. Furthermore, despite my academic justification for my suggested writing procedure and the inclusion of a method to confirm authorship and ownership of the practical knowledge products enabling individual assessment, the active involvement of other appropriately qualified co-researchers in

the construction of my dissertation, remains unresolved. Without seeing my work in its completed format, which would also expose them to my academic justifications, the University staff are still refusing to accept my dissertation and practical artefact for examination. However, on the date when this text was written (25th June 2020), the concluding section of this journey has yet to occur.

Since the practitioner doctorate programmes are a relatively new venture in the academic world, following my experience, it is essential that I make the following warning to those involved in such processes to consider. When undertaking such a process, the practitioner-researcher seeks to achieve academic accreditation for his practical knowledge. In essence, he is presenting and justifying the way he views reality and relates to knowledge, to the academic community. If he is denied the opportunity to complete the process through grounding the knowledge in an accepted epistemic framework, despite conducting the research process in accordance with the academic requirements, extracting tacit knowledge from his subconscious, this may have dire consequences for him as an individual and a practitioner. The significance of such a situation is that the practitioner-researcher is unable to defend the way he relates to knowledge, to justify the basic assumptions of his practical approach and the way he views life in general. If all of these are rejected by the academic community, his professional competence is placed in doubt. In such circumstances a practitioner with integrity cannot proceed with his professional practice, with all the related impact on his personal life. It is essential that academic institutions which plan to supervise such practitioner doctorate programmes be aware of the gravity of this potential situation and be capable of supporting the candidate till completion of the process.

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