Fool’s Gold? Constitution, Sovereignty and the Golden Share in Embraer-Boeing Case
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33423/jabe.v23i5.4567Keywords:
business, economics, golden share, economic sovereignty, parallelism of formsAbstract
The object of this article is to analyze the Golden Share (Ação de Classe Especial) as an instrument of economic sovereignty. It questions whether, legally, there is a possibility of imposing on the Executive Branch the use of the veto power inherent to the golden share in cases where a joint venture of a foreign company with a state-owned company represents a risk to national sovereignty. The hypothesis is that based on the principle of economic sovereignty (art. 170, I), there is an express obligation to the administration to veto in the case where a joint venture of a foreign company with a national company harms the domestic market (art. 219). It concludes that in the mentioned cases there is the possibility of imposing the use of the veto power to the Executive Branch, in case of omission, it is competence of the National Congress, and subsidiarily to the Judiciary Branch, due to the imposing nature of the constitutional principle of economic sovereignty.