

An Evaluation of Human Development in Morocco: A Comparative Approach

Said Malki

State University of New York at New Paltz

There is no consensus among economists about the nature of the relationship between economic growth and the goal of improving human welfare. After World War II, economists tended to accept that the benefits of growth would trickle down to the poor. Nevertheless, there is an evidence of rising income inequality and a stubborn prevalence of poverty in many developing countries. Such evidence stimulated active concern with promoting more equitable growth. During the 1980s, poverty-oriented policies were pushed to the background by the need to cope with macroeconomic shocks. Since then, concern with poverty-oriented policy has revived, but not as an alternative to concern about growth. The evidence of the past half century shows that growth is necessary for alleviating widespread poverty.

In this regard, income per capita remains the most useful single indicator of development, although it is far from ideal. One limitation is that international comparisons require the conversion of national statistics into common currency units, usually U.S. dollars. A more accurate method uses purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations. This method shows that income differences between rich and poor countries are less acute than one finds in statistics based on exchange rates. Other than income, an alternative comparison method is to use physical measures of structural change such as energy consumption, rural population, life expectancy, and female adult literacy.

This paper uses a comparative approach to evaluate the dynamic of the human development index (HDI) in Morocco. This is an important index that measures national socioeconomic development, based on combining measures of education, health, and adjusted real income per capita.

INTRODUCTION

Morocco is a Northern African country, located in the extreme north west of Africa on the doors of continental Europe. The country spans from the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean on the north and the west respectively, into large mountainous areas in the interior body, to the Sahara Desert in the far south. The strait of Gibraltar separates Spain off Morocco with around eight miles span of water.

Morocco has an estimated population of thirty-five and half million people and possess an abundance of natural resources (e.g.; phosphates, iron, manganese, salt, fish) and diverse touristic sites. Despite its natural wealth and its distinguished geographic location, Morocco continues to face serious economic, social, developmental, and environmental challenges.

One of the key measures to assess the overall progress of Morocco as a developing nation is the Human Development Index. The goal of this paper is to assess this index in Morocco using a comparative approach and to discuss barriers and challenges to human development in this North African nation.

ASSESSMENT OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX IN MOROCCO

Human development (HD) is defined as the improvement of the human condition so that people live longer, healthier, and fuller lives. In the development of the concept of HD some aspects were related to people's physical well-being, such as health, nutrition and education, and others to the widening of choice and enhanced empowerment, including participation, political freedom, and cultural aspects (Ranis & Stewart, 2000)¹


The human development index (HDI) is a summary measure of key dimensions of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices from each of these three dimensions².

Morocco's HDI value for 2015 is 0.647— which put the country in 123 position out of 188 countries and territories. As it shown in table 1, between 1990 and 2015, Morocco's HDI value increased from 0.458 to 0.647, an augmentation of 41.4 percent. Table 1 outlines Morocco's progress in each of the HDI indicators. Between 1990 and 2015, Morocco's life expectancy at birth increased by 9.6 years, mean years of schooling rose by 2.8 years and expected years of schooling increased by 5.6 years. Morocco's GNI per capita grew by about 89.9 percent between 1990 and 2015.

**TABLE 1
MOROCCO HDI TRENDS³**

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	64.7	6.5	2.2	3,789	0.458
1995	66.9	7.3	2.8	3,776	0.489
2000	68.6	8.5	3.4	4,380	0.530
2005	70.5	10.0	3.9	5,362	0.575
2010	72.6	11.2	4.2	6,406	0.612
2011	73.0	11.6	4.4	6,633	0.623
2012	73.4	12.1	4.6	6,717	0.634
2013	73.7	12.1	4.8	6,980	0.640
2014	74.0	12.1	5.0	6,985	0.645
2015	74.3	12.1	5.0	7,195	0.647


Source: UNDP (2016)



Let's compare now the situation of the Morocco with Algeria, Turkey, and Portugal. This latter is a close European neighbor of Morocco while Algeria and Turkey are two important countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 below show respectively the dynamic of the HDI in Algeria, Turkey, and Portugal.

TABLE 2
ALGERIA HDI TRENDS


	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	66.7	9.6	3.6	9,895	0.577
1995	68.1	9.8	4.7	8,825	0.600
2000	70.2	10.9	5.9	9,776	0.644
2005	72.2	12.3	6.6	11,779	0.686
2010	73.8	14.0	7.1	12,875	0.724
2011	74.1	14.4	7.3	12,903	0.732
2012	74.3	14.4	7.5	13,060	0.737
2013	74.6	14.4	7.8	13,070	0.741
2014	74.8	14.4	7.8	13,270	0.743
2015	75.0	14.4	7.8	13,533	0.745



The HDI of Algeria has been consistently higher than Morocco throughout the period 1990-2015. Such index reaches in 2015 a value of 0.745 in Algeria against 0.647 in Morocco.

**TABLE 3
TURKEY HDI TRENDS**


	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	64.3	8.9	4.5	10,494	0.576
1995	67.0	9.6	4.8	11,317	0.604
2000	70.0	11.1	5.5	12,815	0.653
2005	72.5	11.9	6.0	14,976	0.687
2010	74.2	13.8	7.2	16,482	0.737
2011	74.4	14.3	7.4	17,630	0.750
2012	74.7	14.4	7.6	17,703	0.754
2013	75.0	14.5	7.7	18,074	0.759
2014	75.3	14.5	7.9	18,312	0.764
2015	75.5	14.6	7.9	18,705	0.767



Similarly, the HDI of Turkey has been steadily higher than Morocco throughout the period 1990-2015. The HDI reaches in 2015 a value of 0.767 in Turkey against 0.647 in Morocco.

**TABLE 4
PORTUGAL HDI TRENDS**


	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	74.3	11.8	6.2	20,223	0.711
1995	75.2	15.0	6.4	22,144	0.759
2000	76.6	15.7	6.6	25,656	0.782
2005	78.0	15.4	7.1	26,331	0.793
2010	79.6	16.2	7.8	26,467	0.818
2011	80.0	16.3	8.0	26,414	0.824
2012	80.3	16.3	8.2	25,322	0.827
2013	80.6	16.8	8.6	25,448	0.837
2014	80.9	16.6	8.9	25,737	0.841
2015	81.2	16.6	8.9	26,104	0.843



The HDI of Portugal has been constantly higher than Morocco during all the period 1990-2015. This index HDI hits in 2015 a value of 0.843 in Portugal against 0.647 in Morocco. In sum, table 5 shows that during the period 1990-2015 the average HDI is 0.585 in Morocco; 0.693 in Algeria; 0.705 in Turkey, and 0.804 in Portugal.

TABLE 5
EVOLUTION OF THE HDI VALUE IN MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL


Year	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Portugal
1990	0.458	0.577	0.576	0.711
1995	0.489	0.600	0.604	0.759
2000	0.530	0.644	0.653	0.782
2005	0.575	0.686	0.687	0.793
2010	0.612	0.724	0.737	0.818
2011	0.623	0.732	0.750	0.824
2012	0.634	0.737	0.754	0.827
2013	0.640	0.741	0.759	0.837
2014	0.645	0.743	0.764	0.841
2015	0.647	0.745	0.767	0.843
Average (1990-2015)	0.585	0.693	0.705	0.804
SD	0.066	0.060	0.067	0.040



With respect to life expectancy at birth throughout 1990-2015 (table 6), it is in average similar and around seventy years in Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey. However, it is higher in Portugal where it about seventy-nine.

TABLE 6
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PORTUGAL

Year	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Portugal
1990	64.7	66.7	64.3	74.3
1995	66.9	68.1	67.0	75.2
2000	68.6	70.2	70.0	76.6
2005	70.5	72.2	72.5	78.0
2010	72.6	73.8	74.2	79.6
2011	73.0	74.1	74.4	80.0
2012	73.4	74.3	74.7	80.3
2013	73.7	74.6	75.0	80.6
2014	74.0	74.8	75.3	80.9
2015	74.3	75.0	75.5	81.2
Average (1990-2015)	71.17	72.38	72.29	78.67
SD	3.36	3.01	3.91	2.50




Nevertheless, when it comes to hospitals beds per 1000 persons, based on available data relating to 2004, Morocco has a value of 0.9 while Algeria, Turkey, and Portugal have respectively a value of 1.7, 2.6, and 3.7. In 2009, the value of hospitals beds per 1000 persons is respectively 1.1; 2.5; and 3.3 in Morocco, Turkey, and Portugal. In 2012, hospitals beds per 1000 persons decreases in Morocco to reach the level of 2004 which is 0.9 (World Bank, 2018).

Concerning the average expected years of schooling during the period 1990-2015 (table 7), Morocco has the lowest value of 10.35. Algeria and Turkey have a comparable value rounded to 13 and Portugal a value around 16.

TABLE 7
EXPECTED YEARS OF SCHOOLING IN MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL


Year	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Portugal
1990	6.5	9.6	8.9	11.8
1995	7.3	9.8	9.6	15.0
2000	8.5	10.9	11.1	15.7
2005	10.0	12.3	11.9	15.4
2010	11.2	14.0	13.8	16.2
2011	11.6	14.4	14.3	16.3
2012	12.1	14.4	14.4	16.3
2013	12.1	14.4	14.5	16.8
2014	12.1	14.4	14.5	16.6
2015	12.1	14.4	14.6	16.6
Average (1990-2015)	10.35	12.86	12.76	15.67
SD	2.005	1.885	2.046	1.366



Regarding the mean years of schooling during the period 1990-2015 (table 8), Morocco has again the lowest average value of 4.03. Algeria and Turkey have an alike value rounded to 7 and Portugal a value around 8.

TABLE 8
MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING IN MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL


Year	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Portugal
1990	2.2	3.6	4.5	6.2
1995	2.8	4.7	4.8	6.4
2000	3.4	5.9	5.5	6.6
2005	3.9	6.6	6.0	7.1
2010	4.2	7.1	7.2	7.8
2011	4.4	7.3	7.4	8.0
2012	4.6	7.5	7.6	8.2
2013	4.8	7.8	7.7	8.6
2014	5.0	7.8	7.9	8.9
2015	5.0	7.8	7.9	8.9
Average (1990-2015)	4.03	6.61	6.65	7.67
SD	0.907799537	1.377279928	1.256383699	0.976780426



The Gross National Income per capital is not an exception to the common pattern (Table 9). Indeed, during the phase 1990-2015, this indicator is an average of \$5,822 in Morocco; \$11,899 in Algeria; \$15,651 in Turkey; and \$24,985 in Portugal.

TABLE 9
GNI PER CAPITA (2011 PPP\$) IN MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TURKEY, AND PORTUGAL

Year	Morocco	Algeria	Turkey	Portugal
1990	3,789	9,895	10,494	20,223
1995	3,776	8,825	11,317	22,144
2000	4,380	9,776	12,815	25,656
2005	5,362	11,779	14,976	26,331
2010	6,406	12,875	16,482	26,467
2011	6,633	12,903	17,630	26,414
2012	6,717	13,060	17,703	25,322
2013	6,980	13,070	18,074	25,448
2014	6,985	13,270	18,312	25,737
2015	7,195	13,533	18,705	26,104
Average (1990-2015)	5,822	11,899	15,651	24,985
SD	1373.909	1738.977	3072.697	2092.151



It is essential to add to income per capital analysis an assessment of inequality. Indeed, Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Based on the World Bank available data, Gini Index in Morocco was 40.7 in Morocco in 2006, 27.6 in Algeria in 2011, 41.9 in Turkey in 2016, and 35.5 in Portugal in 2015 (World Bank, 2018).

Another central indicator is the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population). The national poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines. According to the World Bank (2018), The poverty headcount ratio at \$5.50 a day (2011 PPP)

percentage of population was in Morocco 48.1 in 2006, 29.2 in Algeria in 2011, 9.9 in Turkey year 2006, and 3 in Portugal in year 2015. It is noticed that the latest data about Morocco regarding the poverty headcount ratio and the Gini Index refers to 2006. One should wonder reasons behind the non-communication by the Moroccan Government of recent data to the World Bank. Is this intentional or due to deficiencies of the Moroccan Department of Statistics?

With respect to GDP and HDI, there is a correlation between these two variables. The Pearson's R (correlation coefficient) is equals to 0.97. Based on the data and years outlined in the table 10, GDP is highly correlated with HDI. R equals 0.97 which is considered a large effect. In general, increases in GDP may impact certain HDI parameter and/or vice versa. Nevertheless, it is unclear how, or if, the HDI and its dimension indices are correlated to other measurement variables, with previous studies being largely inconclusive or restricted to narrow study scopes (Metha, L. (2014); Ouedraogo (2013); and Ranis et al (2000).

**TABLE 10
GDP & HDI IN MOROCCO**

Year	GDP in Billion (Current USD)	HDI value
1990	30.18	0.458
1995	39.03	0.489
2000	38.857	0.530
2005	62.343	0.575
2010	93.217	0.612
2011	101.37	0.623
2012	98.266	0.634
2013	106.826	0.640
2014	109.881	0.645
2015	100.593	0.647

Source: World Bank Data

	GDP	HDI
GDP	1	
HDI	R =0.97	1

**TABLE 11
GDP & HDI IN MOROCCO**

Year	GNI per Capital (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1990	3,789	0.458
1995	3,776	0.489
2000	4,380	0.530
2005	5,362	0.575
2010	6,406	0.612
2011	6,633	0.623
2012	6,717	0.634
2013	6,980	0.640
2014	6,985	0.645
2015	7,195	0.647

Source: World Bank Data

	GNI per Capital (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
GNI per Capital (2011 PPP\$)	1	
HDI value	0.985786097	1

Additionally, there is a positive correlation between the GNI per Capita and the HDI based on table 11 data. The Pearson's R (correlation coefficient) is equal to 0.99. Based on the data and years outlined in the table 11, GNI is highly correlated with HDI. R almost equals 1 which implies a huge effect.

**TABLE 12
ANNUAL FRESHWATER WITHDRAWALS DATA RELATING TO MOROCCO
AVAILABLE ONLY FOR 1980, 1985, 1992, 1995, and 2010.**

Year	Annual freshwater withdrawals, total (billion cubic meters)	HDI value
1980	10.05	0.40
1985	11	0.44
1992	11.04	0.47
1995	11.26	0.49
2010	10.35	0.61

Source: World Bank & Knoema.com

I expected that the increase of total annual freshwater withdrawals (billion cubic meters) should have a positive influence on HDI in Morocco. However, there is a very weak and negative correlation between these two variables. This raises questions about the effectiveness and the efficiency of water policies in Morocco and their impacts on human development. In addition, if the Moroccan Government provides to

the World Bank with more data relating to annual freshwater withdrawals, the correlation results could be different and meaningful and may even be used to explore the nature of the causality.

	Annual freshwater withdrawals, total (billion cubic meters)	HDI value
Annual freshwater withdrawals, total (billion cubic meters)	1	
HDI value	R= -0.022733425	1

TABLE 13
ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION (kWh PER CAPITA) & HDI IN MOROCCO

Year	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	HDI value
1990	358.131	0.458
1995	429.839	0.489
2000	489.088	0.530
2005	633.104	0.575
2010	774.368	0.612
2011	823.888	0.623
2012	874.428	0.634
2013	878.587	0.640
2014	901.128	0.645

Source: World Bank Data

	Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	HDI value
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)	1	
HDI value	0.990702675	1

There is a strong positive correlation between electric power consumption per capita and HDI in Morocco. The Pearson's R (correlation coefficient) is almost equal to 1. Based on the data and years outlined in the table 13, electric power consumption is highly correlated with HDI. R equals 0.99 which is considered a huge effect. In general, increases in electric power consumption may impact certain HDI parameter and/or vice versa.

Susnik & Zaag (2017) state that as access to clean water increases, the population overall is healthier, enabling greater participation in education and employment, which in turn will contribute to an increase in personal GNI. Similarly, access to electricity strongly causes a change in the GNI. Indeed, by having access to electricity, the working and/or studying day can be lengthened, and previously laborious manual tasks can be made greatly more efficient using electric motors (e.g., gathering water from a deep well). This can lead to enhanced education and employment opportunities, which in turn raise personal GNI.

In total, one should go beyond the analysis of correlation by studying the nature of the causality and the relationship between HDI as the dependent variable in one hand, and a variety of independent variables such as electric power consumption, annual freshwater withdrawals, GNI per capita, GDP, life expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling, and mean years of schooling. A multiple regression can be utilized in this regard, but the main issue in Morocco is the lack of consistent time series data for the majority of the independent variables.

That said, the analysis of HDI in Morocco can be explored based on a mixed approach where a multiple regression is coupled with a qualitative method. Since human capital development is connected to human development, I propose to outline in table 14 some essential qualitative indicators.

TABLE 14
HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO COMPARED TO OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Category	Morocco	Algeria	Ghana	Turkey	Portugal
Public Spending on Education (%of GDP)	5.4	4.3	5.9	2.9	5.1
Quality of Education System Rank (Age Group 15-24)	110	82	69	83	37
High Skills Employment Share Rank (Age Group 25-54)	104	76	103	69	41
Overall Human Capita Index 2016 Rank (out of 130 countries)	98	117	84	73	41

Human Capital Report (2016)- World Economic Forum

The Moroccan public spending on education as a percentage of GDP is equals to 5.4. This is higher than Portugal (5.1), Algeria (4.3), and Turkey (2.9). Nevertheless, Morocco is ranked 110 with respect to Quality of Education System (Age Group 15-24), while Portugal, Algeria, and Turkey ranked respectively 37, 82, and 83. Ghana spent almost the same percentage of GDP in terms of public spending on education, but its quality of education system rank (69).

Regarding the High Skills Employment Share Rank (Age Group 25-54), Morocco is ranked 104 while Algeria, Turkey, and Portugal have much better positions. Their ranks are respectively 76, 69, and 41. Finally, the Overall Human Capital Index 2016 rank of Morocco is 98. Ghana, Turkey, and Portugal have clearly better positions because their ranks are respectively 84, 73, and 41. In this context, it is central to discuss factors behind the poor achievements of Morocco in the areas of human development despite the country's resources.

BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO

The Moroccan Minister of Finance states during an interview with Morocco World News that one of the major limitation in Morocco is the disjunction between GDP growth and job creation in the country, as employment does not follow the evolution of growth. Furthermore, the average employment rate between 1999 and 2014 is 68.7 percent for men, against 23.7 percent for women. Additionally, gender parity does not take place in the labor market. Women are also particularly present in low productivity sectors, especially the agricultural sector (El Masaiti, 2017).

Moreover, a lack of developed skills is a handicap to economic and social development, specifically the poor performance of primary schools' students. A 2015 report by the High Committee for Education has shown that the number of dropouts is still high, indicating that 4 million students have quit school in the past 12 years, 3 million of whom left before finishing middle school, 500,000 before finishing primary school, and 300,000 before finishing high school. Concerning scientific subjects, Morocco ranked second-to-last in the list. This low ranking is ascribed to students' inability to achieve an average grade in mathematics and physics and their difficulties in mastering Arabic (El Masaiti, 2017).

In this context, El Amraoui (2018) explains that overcrowding, the lack of an efficient strategy and poor administration are harming public schools in Morocco and diminishing the opportunities available to underprivileged children, experts, teachers and students. Moreover, the crisis in the education sector comes despite repeated efforts by successive governments to reform the archaic system. Based on the UNESCO report of 2014, Morocco is ranked among the 21 worst countries in the field of education, with more than half of students in public schools failing to acquire necessary reading and math skills. In context, it appears that such situation is due to the absence of effectiveness and the efficacy of the Moroccan strategy of education at both the planning and the implementation levels.

In the meantime, social disparity is widening with the growth of private schools as higher-income families increasingly opt to pay for better services, threatening those who rely on free and quality education. Despite high tuition costs, the number of those shifting from public to private schools soared from 4 percent in 1999 to 15 percent in 2015. Another subject of people's discomfort in Morocco is the draft bill introduced by the Government, which aims at putting an end to free education in the kingdom. The bill proposes that preschool, primary and secondary education should remain free of charge for all Moroccans but suggests registration fees for high schools and universities for middle and high-income families. The draft law has angered parents and education syndicates, who consider the move a violation of Moroccan citizens' right to free education (El Amraoui, 2018).

Another issue is the impacts of land management in Morocco on the organization of school enrolment opportunities. It is a question that imposes at times restrictive choices and leans in favor of considering other parameters that do not only rely on the sole will of the department in charge of the education sector. In fact, the education and training system in Morocco has been developed in concordance with local development. Consequently, the rural area remained for a long time less developed from an organizational and schooling point of view, even if its population is far more important. Additionally, mountainous areas and inaccessible areas witnessed a slower development of schooling opportunities (UNESCO, 2015).

Finally, Morocco's climate does influence the development of schooling opportunities. Often, several tribes living in mountainous and sub-Saharan areas organize their social life according to climate conditions and are compelled to adopt a transhumance life according to seasons, in search of better life conditions for themselves and for their livestock. This situation has made the organization of schooling opportunities very difficult. Accounting for this phenomenon and designing a suitable educational offer required a lot of time. With the decentralization process that started with the division of regions into sixteen subdivisions, the lack of basic infrastructure and equitable access to social services emerged as key obstacles to providing universal and fairly costly education for all Moroccans regardless of their socio-economic background (UNESCO, 2015).

One can wrangle about the political motivations behind dividing Morocco into sixteen administrative regions. The region remains weak in the absence of decentralized political and economic empowerments. The administrative divisions of Morocco into regions is a mere executive de-concentration since central power of the Makhzen or its local representatives continues to be the sole decision makers. Moroccan is not yet in the era where the real administrative decentralization can redistribute authority, responsibility, and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. A true administrative decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing, and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities (World Bank Group, 2018).

Although the Moroccan Government claims that its economic regionalization policy is based on the principle of decentralization, table 15 shows clearly that less than 28% of the government budget spending is deployed to all sixteen economic regions. In the other hand, common services constitute the financial disbursements allocated to the central government and its regional and local agencies. Such services continue to receive the part of the lion. Table 15 shows the latest data available at the Moroccan Ministry of Finances.

TABLE 15
REPARTITION OF THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT BUDGETSPENDING
PER REGION (Moroccan Dirham: 1 MAD = 0.11 USD)

Region	2012	% of Total Regions (2012)	2013	% of Total Regions (2013)
Common Services	50,499,707,534	72.50	50,797,864,660	72.13
OUED ED-DAHAB-LAGOUIRA REGION	156,644,359	0.22	127,687,969	0.18
LAAYOUNE-BOUJDOUR-SAKIA AL HAMRA REGION	172,941,388	0.25	200,802,744	0.29
GUELMIM-ES-SEMARA REGION	387,162,415	0.56	409,709,430	0.58
SOUS-MASSA-DRAA REGION	1,776,407,274	2.55	1,741,246,808	2.47
GHARB-CHRARDA-BNI HSEN REGION	976,963,602	1.40	928,533,279	1.32
CHAOUIA-OUARDIGHA REGION	599,682,420	0.86	597,750,901	0.85
MARRAKECH-TENSIFT-AL-HAOUZ REGION	2,299,711,454	3.30	2,188,791,118	3.11
ORIENTAL REGION	1,509,726,331	2.17	1,321,119,710	1.88
GRAND CASABLANCA REGION	1,440,726,847	2.07	1,534,007,176	2.18
RABAT-SALE-ZEMMOUR-ZAER REGION	2,101,776,733	3.02	2,267,865,862	3.22
REGION DE DOUKALA-ABDA REGION	943,267,320	1.35	916,997,697	1.30
TADLA-AZILAL REGION	784,729,615	1.13	822,137,467	1.17
MEKNES-TAFILALET REGION	1,583,379,081	2.27	1,236,444,347	1.76
FES-BOULEMANE REGION	1,259,815,655	1.81	1,456,423,065	2.07
TAZA-AL HOCEIMA-TAOUNATE REGION	993,354,736	1.43	1,034,643,240	1.47
TANGER-TETOUAN REGION	2,167,015,236	3.11	2,839,389,527	4.03
TOTAL REGIONS	69,653,012,000	100	70,421,415,000	100

Source: Moroccan Ministry of Finances

<http://www.data.gov.ma/data/fr/dataset/budget-de-l-etat-des-annees-2012-et-2013>

With respect to the allocation of the Moroccan government budget for the year 2017, it is important to note the following facts (Table 16):

- The budget deployed to the “King” & Royal Court” equals 2,624,347,000 dirhams which is five times the budget deployed to the Ministry of Employment & Professional Insertion.
- The budget of the Penitentiary General Administration corresponds to 1,966,133,000 dirhams which is four times the funds provided to the Ministry of Employment & Professional Insertion.
- The budget of the Interior Ministry (police; security; auxiliary forces, Intelligence Services etc.) is 26,786,780,000 dirhams which is nine times the budget deployed to the Ministry of Youth & Sport; 51 times the budget of the Ministry of Employment & Professional Insertion; 43 times the budget of the Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development; and 1.6 time the Budget of the Ministry of Health.
- The consumption spending of the Ministry of Education, Professional Training, Higher Studies & Scientific Research equals 49,552,358,000 dirhams. The investment spending of this Ministry constitutes 6,711,286,000 dirhams which is only 13.5 % of consumption spending (e.g.; employees’ wages and salaries).
- Despite that Morocco is not officially at war, its National Defense Administration budget is 2.25 times the Budget of the Health Ministry; 12 times the budget of the Ministry of Youth & Sports; 70 times the Budget of the Ministry Employment & Professional Insertion, and 60 times the Budget of the Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development.
- The Consumption spending (e.g.; wages and other unproductive expenses) at the Moroccan National Defense Administration constitutes almost four times the investment spending of this department. Often the military is used internally to contain domestic manifestations and citizens uprisings.
- The Moroccan Constitution is based on French and Islamic law and French legal procedure. The article 41 of the Moroccan Constitution states that “The King, *the Prince of Believers*, insures the respect of Islam. Article 47 notes that the King is the chief of the Government.
- The budget of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs reaches 4,578,830,000 dirhams in 2017. This constitutes 7 times the budget of the Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development; 9 times the budget of the Ministry of Employment & Professional Insertion; and one and half time the budget of the Ministry of Youth & Sports.

While one recognizes the importance of faith and the dominant Islamic character of the Moroccan society, Islam is used to legitimate the political hegemony of the king. Beyond double standards and rhetorical discourse, in nowadays era of artificial intelligence and nontechnology, the Government of Morocco should facilitate a constitutional metamorphose and build the foundations of a secular state where separation of powers and freedom of believe are safeguarded.

TABLE 16
REPARTITION OF THE MOROCCAN BUDGET BETWEEN SECURITY, ORDER & DEFENSE
SECTORS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SECTORS (IN DIRHAMS)

Ministry	Budget Consumption Spending(a)	% of Σ (a)	Budget Investment Spending (b)	% of Σ (b)	(a)+(b)	(a) + (b) as % of (c)
The King	543,456,000	0.29	-----		543,456,000	0.19
Royal Court	1,949,283,000	1.04	131,608,000	0.13	2,080,891,000	0.73
Interior Ministry (e.g.; police; security; auxiliary forces)	21,024,460,000	11.20	5,762,320,000	5.87	26,786,780,000	9.37
Penitentiary General Administration	1,555,433,000	0.83	410,700,000	0.42	1,966,133,000	0.69
Health Ministry	11,894,752,000	6.34	4,400,000,000	4.48	16,294,752,000	5.70
Ministry of Youth & Sports	682,324,000	0.36	2,375,000,000	2.42	3,057,324,000	1.07
Ministry of Employment and Professional Insertion	463,973,000	0.25	63,420,000	0.06	527,393,000	0.18
Ministry of Education, Professional Training, Higher Studies & Scientific Research	49,552,358,000	26.39	6,711,286,000	6.83	56,263,644,000	19.7
National Defense Administration	29,371,692,000	15.65	7,586,490,000	6.83	36,958,182,000	12.92
Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development	557,269,000	0.30	63,420,000	0.06	620,689,000	0.22
Ministry of Habous & Islamic Affairs	2,950,276,000	1.57	1,628,554,000	1.66	4,578,830,000	1.60
	Total Budget Consumption Spending 187,734,785,000	100	Total Budget Investment Spending 98,231,436,000	100.00	(c) 285,966,221,000	100

Source: Secretary General of the Government, Morocco
http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/Fr/2017/BO_6577-bis_fr.pdf?ver=2017-06-12-111739-600

Moreover, the implementation in Morocco of an effective decentralization and a constructive regionalization strategy necessitates the financial empowerment of regions and their autonomy, the dissemination of democracy and the transformations of political institutions and processes in a way that protects citizens' rights and insures transparency and accountability. Recently, EU has expressed a new assertiveness in threatening to suspend aid to Morocco if reforms were not implemented. The EU has seen

Morocco as a solid rock in a stormy sea which it is in its own interest to support. A protest movement made up of cross-ideological coalitions of many existing civil society organizations but also a large number of previously unaffiliated youth erupted in February 2011 (called the February 20 Movement – F20M), demanded greater social justice and a reform of the constitution, among other things. Only few months later, on July 1, 2011, the new constitution was adopted in a popular referendum, and by January 2012, a new government coalition was in power, led by the Islamist Justice and Development Party, following parliamentary elections in November 2011 (Bergh 2013).

The entire reform process was one of ‘guided change’ from above, i.e. by King Mohamed VI and his entourage, to minimize the social turmoil which to some extent was aimed at rocking the foundations of the monarchy (Bergh and Rossi-Doria 2015). Although it did not significantly reduce his powers, EU officials welcomed King Mohammed VI’s reform. The European reactions rarely showed any sympathy with the February 20 movement and EU institutions were not ready to support it, preferring to keep funding the same elitist and palace loyal NGOs that lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the F20M members. However, within the EU, there was a divide between southern and northern EU member states, with the former blocking all attempts by the latter to convey a message that reforms were not being implemented (Youngs 2014).

EU is back to the same logic as before the Arab Spring in which regime stability is a priority and the increase in human rights violations are rarely mentioned. Thus, while the post-Arab Spring European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) consisting of a new partnership for democracy and a new response to a changing neighborhood’ emphasized the need for democratic transformation and good governance principles more generally, it swiftly became obvious that the EU continues to cooperate with authoritarian governments and push its neo-liberal economic agenda (Del Sarto, 2016).

In this context, Morocco exhibits several human rights problems, including limitations on political rights and civil liberties. At the same time, it boasts a wide spectrum of political parties, media outlets, and civil society organizations. Societal-level human rights problems—such as discrimination against women—are generally shared by other states in the region. The most significant human rights problems are the lack of citizens’ right to change the country’s monarchical form of government, corruption in all branches of government, and widespread disregard for the rule of law by security forces (Arieff, 2013).

Other abuses documented by the U.S. State Department include violent repression of peaceful protests, torture and incommunicado detention by the security forces, poor prison conditions, politically motivated imprisonments, infringements on freedom of expression, assembly, and religion; lack of judicial independence; gender discrimination; trafficking in persons and child labor. Although Morocco has a large and diverse private press, direct criticism of the monarchy or the government is in general not tolerated. Media advocates contend that some prosecutions of critical journalists on charges ostensibly unrelated to their journalism are in fact designed to inhibit independent coverage and commentary, and that financial pressures are employed to quiet some media (Arieff, 2013).

According to ENCA (2018), a Moroccan court on June 26, 2018 sentenced fifty-three “Hirak”⁴ members to prison terms ranging from one year to twenty years. Protest leader Nasser Zefzafi and three others were handed each twenty years jail terms for "plotting to undermine the security of the state." Nasser Zefzafi protested against harsh economic and social problems in Morocco’s northern Rif region (Reuters, 2018)⁵.

Obviously, the political climate in Morocco does not favor an open and objective evaluation of the Moroccan human development’s state. The Moroccan government policies in the areas of education, health, income redistribution, taxation, water & electricity, and taxation are purely centralized. “A check and balances” approach is needed to monitor the government policies and civil society and local citizens should be key decision makers. It is not yet the case in Morocco.

The fostering of human development in Morocco depends on the willingness of its political instance to reform the constitution through an independent constitutional committee. This latter should be autonomous from the Makhzen and should represent major components of the Moroccan society. The constitutional legitimacy should be generated from Moroccan citizens and a real separation of powers should be guaranteed.

That said, it is not productive to implement blindly liberal or neo-classic development policies imposed by international organizations (e.g.; European Union; World Bank; IMF). Any rational strategy of human development should consider social, cultural, historical, and economic characteristics of Morocco. The Moroccan governmental entities involved in human development policies should scan their internal and external environments to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This scanning should be monitored by an independent committee that includes national and international auditors and observers.

During the environmental scanning phase, citizens, employees, NGOs, professionals, local community, political movements, and relevant international organizations should be surveyed. Simultaneously, the independent audit committee should assess not only the level of transparency and accountability of relevant Moroccan governmental agencies, but also the real impacts of international financial assistance (e.g.; loans; grants) disbursed to Morocco during at least the two last decades.

Once the assessment of prior human development policies and the scanning of the environment are finalized, the Moroccan government representatives should cooperate with the autonomous committee to define new goals, objectives, strategies, and key performance indicators. The new human development strategic plan should be shared with stakeholders cited and seek their feedback and added-values.

Once a consensus is reached, the implementation of the new human development strategic plan requires a continual monitoring not only by the Moroccan government, but also regional stakeholders and an independent committee including Moroccan and international auditors. All this is without a tangible substance, if the Moroccan government does not empower local communities with funding and with a true decentralization of economic and political powers. In this regard, the international community should support all efforts to generate democracy and to reach a comprehensive constitutional change in Morocco.

In this context, the radical change of the human development strategy in Morocco should go along with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals⁶.

- Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
- Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
- Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
- Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning
- Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
- Goal 6: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all
- Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
- Goal 8: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all
- Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation
- Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries
- Goal 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
- Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
- Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
- Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources
- Goal 15: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss
- Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies
- Goal 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Furthermore, the new strategy of human development should integrate young people, women, and rural inhabitants into the labor force by preparing them for suitable jobs. Financial inclusion, including the use of FinTech, is a central tool for enabling people, as approximately the majority of adults in the region do not have bank accounts. Additionally, transparent fiscal policy should be used to invest in human resources and infrastructure. Concerning corruption, it needs to be weeded out, as it remains a

major constraint to private sector activity and public-sector efficiency. It is vital to focus on transparency and governance, which are areas of weakness in Morocco (Azour, 2018).

The recommendation of “Marrakesh Conference” may constitute also a reference during the evaluation of the development challenges and opportunities in Morocco. The Marrakesh conference focused on the specific policies needed by identifying new sources of growth and measures to make it more inclusive. The priorities identified during the Marrakech event can be summarized as follows (IMF, 2018):

- **Accountability:** increase transparency and strengthen institutions to improve governance, tackle corruption and ensure responsibility for inclusive policies.
- **Competition:** foster a more vibrant private sector through improved access to finance and a better business environment with fewer barriers and less red tape.
- **Technology & Trade:** leverage technology and nurture trade to generate new sources of growth, create jobs, and foster prosperity.
- **No one left behind:** build strong safety nets and strengthen legal rights to empower disadvantaged groups, including youth, women, rural populations, and refugees.
- **Opportunity:** increase and improve the quality of social and investment spending and pursue fairer taxation to support growth, lift-up citizens and share the burden of reform more equitably.
- **Workers:** invest in people and reform education to equip workers for the new economy.

All these recommendations and measures are useless without the dissemination of democracy, the rationalization of public finances, and the fostering of the governance system in Morocco. Even if this country was able generate a higher level of Gross National Product (GNP), the way economic resources are distributed and allocated would lead to unexpected human development performance for any given macro-economic achievement and specifically the level or growth in GNP per capita (Ranis & Stewart, 2000).

Moreover, the female primary enrolment ratios play an important role and should get priority attention from policy-makers. This is further strengthened by the strongly positive role in success played by the female/male enrolment ratio. Additionally, not only the government’s ability to raise revenue is potentially important for human development, but also the reallocation of the government budget to priority social expenditures can make a large difference (Ranis & Stewart, 2000).

The implementation of a human development strategy requires monitoring and evaluation not only by the concerned governmental agencies, but also the civil society, the citizens, political activists, the media, and international stakeholders. In this regard, it is vital to outline the following elements (Monjib, 2011):

- Media laws should be reformed for the broadcast media to be free from the current severe level of state control.
- The electoral system should be reformed to prevent elites and business leaders from being elected through “vote buying.” The most effective measure in this regard would be the transformation of Morocco into a single district. “This would limit drastically the use of dirty money by local elites and political entrepreneurs. It would also help bring about a national elite that can stand up to the monarchical autocracy which dominates the central government”.
- The reform of the criminal law to ban torture and to abrogate the 2003 anti-terrorism laws. This latter may be used to deter proactive activism and political oppositions.
- Private investment laws should be reformed in a way that enhances equal opportunities for all investors including those who are not favored by the “economic Makhzen⁷.”
- International pro-democracy and human rights NGOs would be more effective if they succeed in persuading their governments to decouple economic and strategic interests from democracy promotion.
- The relationship between the West and the MENA’s people can improve if human rights are an end in themselves and not a rhetorical tool.

Undoubtedly, the improvement of human development in Morocco is not a mere technical task. It is instead a synergy that requires an effective government leadership, transparency, national consensus, and a participative decision-making approach.

CONCLUSION

One size does not fit all in economics of development. While it is imperative for the developing country to remain in line with international standards, the domestic political, cultural, and social characteristics should shape its development strategy. Despite Morocco's exceptional resources and strategic geographic location, its human development issues are due to: (i) the lack of rationalization and accountability of governmental spending; (ii) the absence of fiscal equity; (iii) corruption; and (iv) the control of major economic sectors (e.g.; real estate, retail, fishing industry) by political elites and the "economic Makhzen".

In the absence of consistent time series data relating to Moroccan human development indicators, it may be suitable to potentially use a qualitative research method and a sampling method covering major stakeholders (e.g.; international and national NGO; local communities; men & women in the rural area; academia; professionals; political activists). One key element is to examine more deeply the allocation of the Moroccan public budget per administrative region in the field of human development. Also, it is crucial to evaluate in a comprehensive way the Moroccan government expenditures in human development sectors compared to public funding of the king palaces, the security forces, police, and military agencies.

END NOTES

1. HDI Countries Ranking: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>
2. Klugman, Rodriguez & Choi (2011) provide a full explanation of the HDI calculation methodology: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2011_01.pdf
3. Data of HDI and its indicators (Table 1 thru table 9) is collected from UNDP (2016).
Morocco: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MAR.pdf
Algeria: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/DZA.pdf
Turkey: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/TUR.pdf
Portugal : http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PRT.pdf
4. Translation of the Arabic word "Hirak" is Movement
5. More information about recent uprising and protests in Morocco can be found in the following sources:
 - Aljazeera TV. (2017). Inside Story - What's behind Morocco's street protests?
<https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2017/05/morocco-street-protests-170519194032194.html>
 - Aljazeera TV.(2017). Morocco police hunt Rif region protest leader.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/morocco-police-hunt-rif-region-protest-leader-170527140125639.html>
 - Aljazeera Channel. (2017). Morocco's al-Hoceima gears up for 'million-man march'.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/morocco-al-hoceima-gears-million-man-march-170719070946638.html>
 - France 24 TV (2018). Morocco: "The Rif rebels" are in the king's crosshairs.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RU5WgpB3bE0>
 - Human Rights Watch (2017). World Report.
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf
6. Details about each of these seventeen goals is available at <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/>
7. Makhzen is the governing institution in Morocco and in pre-1957 Tunisia, centered on the king and consisting of royal notables, top-ranking military personnel, landowners, security service bosses, civil servants and other well-connected members of the establishment. The term "Makhzen" is also popularly used in Morocco as a word meaning "State" or "Government". For more details refer to Daadaoui, M. (2011). Le Makhzen and the State Formation in Morocco. Springer Link

REFERENCES

- Adam, A., Kammas, P., & Lapatinas, A. (2015). Income inequality and the Tax Structure: Evidence from Developed and Developing countries. *Journal of Comparative Economics.*, 43(1), 138–154.
- Aljazeera (2017). Inside Story - What's behind Morocco's street protests?. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2017/05/morocco-street-protests-170519194032194.html>
- Aljazeera (2017). *Morocco police hunt Rif region protest leader*. Retrieved from Aljazeera Channel. (2017). *Morocco's Al-Hoceima gears up for 'Million-Man*
- Arieff, A. (2013). *Morocco: Current issues. CRS report. Congressional research service*. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21579.pdf>
- Azour, J. (2018). *Promoting the inclusive growth agenda in the Arab region*, IMF, Arab Economic Forum, Lebanon.
- Benchemsi, A. (2011). *Morocco and press freedom: A complicated relationship*. NiemanReports.<http://niemanreports.org/articles/morocco-and-press-freedom-a-complicated-relationship/>
- Bergh, S. I. (2013). *Governance reforms in Morocco - Beyond electoral authoritarianism?* in: Abbas Kadhim (ed): *Governance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Handbook*, London: Routledge, 435-450
- Bergh, S.I and Daniele, R. (2015) Observing the dynamics of Morocco's Arab Spring in the High Atlas', *Mediterranean Politics*, 20 (2), pp. 198-216.
- Blum, M. (2013). The Influence of inequality on the standard of living: Worldwide Anthropometric Evidence from the 19th and 20th centuries. *Economics and Human Biology*, 11(4), 436–452.
- Chakravarty, S.R. (2003). A generalized human development index. *Revue of Development Economics*. 7(1), 99–114.
- Del Sarto, R. A. (2016) Normative empire Europe: The EU, its borderlands, and the 'Arab Spring'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (2), 215–232.
- Del Sarto, R. A. (2016). Normative empire Europe: The EU, its Borderlands, and the 'Arab Spring'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (2), 215–232.
- El. Amraoui, A. (2018). *How an education crisis is hurting Morocco's poor*. Al Jazeera Channel. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/education-crisis-hurting-morocco-poor-180306225706337.html>
- El. Masaiti, A. (2017). Five problems hold back Morocco's economy: Minister of the Economy. *Morocco World News*. Retrieved from <https://www.morocoworldnews.com/2017/10/232525/5-problems-hold-back-moroccos-economy-minister-of-economy/>
- Eljechtimi, A. (2018). Moroccan Court jails Rif protest leader for twenty years. Reuters. *World News*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-protests/moroccan-court-jails-rif-protest-leader-for-20-years-idUSKBN1JN05R>
- ENCA South Africa Independent TV (2018). *Thousands rally in Morocco for jailed Rif opponents*. Retrieved from <https://www.enca.com/africa/thousands-rally-in-morocco-for-jailed-rif-opponents>
- Gavel, D. (2015). *The future of democracy in the Arab World: Reform versus revolution*, Harvard Kennedy School, ASH Center for Democratic Governance & Innovation. Retrieved from <http://www.challengestodemocracy.us/home/reform-not-revolution-is-path-to-democratic-governance-in-arab-world/#sthash.XS0eXwMQ.w9EBw3bv.dpbs>
http://www.amb-maroc.fr/constitution/Nouvelle_Constitution_%20Maroc2011.pdf
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/morocco-police-hunt-rif-region-protest-leader-170527140125639.html>
- IMF. (2018). Statement by the International Monetary Fund, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and Arab Monetary Fund at the end of the conference on promoting growth, jobs, and inclusiveness in the Arab World. *IMF Press Release*, No 18/31. Retrieved from

- <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/01/30/pr1831-statement-by-imf-arab-fund-for-economic-and-social-development-and-arab-monetary-fund>
- Jeni Klugman, J. Rodríguez, F. & Choi, H.J. (2011). *The HDI 2010: New Controversies, Old Critiques*. UNPD. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2011_01.pdf
- Klugman, J, Rodríguez, F. & Choi, H. (2011). *The HDI 2010: New controversies, Old Critiques*, Lavenex, S.A.& Schimmelfennig, F. (2011) EU democracy promotion in the neighborhood: from leverage to governance? *Democratization* 18 (4), 885-909.
- March'*.<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/07/morocco-al-hoceima-gears-million-man-march-170719070946638.html>
- Metha, L. (2014). Water and Human Development. *World Development*, 59, 59–69.
- Monjib, M. (2011). *The democratization process in Morocco: Progress, obstacles and the Impact of the Islamist-secularist divide*. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.<https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-democratization-process-in-morocco-progress-obstacles-and-the-impact-of-the-islamist-secularist-divide/>
- Moroccan Secretary General of the Government. (2011). *The Constitution*.
- Ouedraogo, N. S. (2013). Energy consumption and human development: Evidence from a panel cointegration and error correction model. *Energy*, 63, 28–41.
- Ranis, G. & Stewart, F. (2000). Strategies for success in human development. *Journal of Human Development*, 1(1), 49-69. <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~granis/papers/cp0558.pdf>
- Ravallion, M. (2010). Troubling tradeoffs in the human development index. *Policy Research, Working Paper*,5484, World Bank, Washington DC.
- Ravallion, M. (2011). On multidimensional indices of poverty. *Journal of Economic Inequality*, 9(2), 235–2480.
- State Department. (2012). *Morocco 2012 human rights report*. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204586.pdf>
- State Department. (2017). *Morocco 2017 human rights report*. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277501.pdf>
- Susnik, J. & Zaag, P. (2017). Correlation and causation between the UN human development index and national and personal wealth and resource exploitation. *Economic Research*., 30, (1).
- The Economist (2018). *Morocco political structure*. Available at <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=414119825&Country=Morocco&topic=Summary&subtopic=Political+structure>
- The World Bank Group. (2018). *Administrative decentralization*. Retrieved from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/admin.htm>
- UNESCO. (2015). *Education for All 2015 national review: Morocco. EFA National Report*. Retrieved from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002317/231799e.pdf>
- UNHCR. (2014). 2013 Country reports on human rights practices – Morocco. RefWorld. <http://www.refworld.org/country,,USDOS,,MAR,,53284a9d3,0.html>
- United Nations Development Program (2017). *Human development report*,Oxford University Press, New York.
- UNPD. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrp_2011_01.pdf
- World Bank (2018). *Data*. Accessible at <https://data.worldbank.org/>
<https://data.worldbank.org/topic/health?locations=MA-DZ-TR-PT>
- World Economic Forum . (2016). Human capital report: Morocco. <http://reports.weforum.org/human-capital-report-2016/economies/#economy=MAR>
- World Report. (2017). Morocco. *Human Rights Watch*, 432-438. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2017-web.pdf
- Youngs, R. (2014). *Europe in the new Middle East: Opportunity or exclusion?* Oxford.